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According to the personalization principle, addressing learners by means of a person-
alized compared to a nonpersonalized message can foster learning. Interestingly,
though, a recent study found that the personalization principle can invert for aversive
contents. The present study investigated whether the negative effect of a personal-
ized message for an aversive content can be compensated when learners are in a
happy mood. It was hypothesized that the negative effect of a personalized com-
pared to a nonpersonalized message would only be observable for participants in a
sad mood, while for participants in a happy mood a personalized message should be
beneficial. A 2  2 between-subject design with mood (happy vs. sad) and personali-
zation (personalized vs. nonpersonalized message) was used (N = 125 University stu-
dents). Mood was experimentally varied prior to learning. Learning outcomes were
measured by a retention and a transfer test. Results were essentially in line with the
assumption: For participants in the sad mood condition, a negative effect of a person-
alized message was observable for retention and transfer. For participants in the
happy mood condition, a positive effect of personalized message was observable for
retention, but no effect for transfer. Note that the manipulation check measure for
the mood induction procedure did not detect differences between conditions; this
may be due to a shortcoming of the used measure (as indicated by an additional evalua-
tion study). The study emphasizes the importance to consider the inherent emotional
content of a topic, such as its aversive nature, since the emotional content of a topic can
be a boundary condition for design principles in multimedia learning. The study also
highlights the complex interplay of externally induced and inherently arising emotions.
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1 | INTRODUCTION
Several design principles have evolved over the last decades on how
to present text and illustration in a comprehensible way. These
principles are based upon influencing theories such as the Cognitive
Theory of Multimedia Learning (CTML; Mayer, 2020; Mayer, 2014)
and the Cognitive Load Theory (CLT; Sweller et al., 2011). More
recently, these theories also integrated emotional factors. This is
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reflected in the Cognitive Affective Theory of Learning with Media
(CATLM, Moreno, 2006; Moreno & Mayer, 2007), which is a further
development of the CTML. Likewise, it is reflected in considerations
about how emotional factors can be incorporated in CLT (Plass &
Kalyuga, 2019). The research about emotional factors in multimedia
learning focuses on adding emotionality to learning. This can be done
either by inducing moods prior to the learning phase (e.g., Knörzer
et al., 2016; Navratil & Kühl, 2019; cf. Plass & Kalyuga, 2019) or by
internal mood induction procedures, such as by adding emotional
aspects to illustrations or text (cf. emotional design; e.g., Plass
et al., 2014; Um et al., 2012; for meta-analyses see Brom et al., 2018;
Wong & Adesope, 2020). However, what is mostly neglected so far is
that some topics are inherently emotional loaded, for instance topics
about serious diseases. There is some preliminary evidence that some
design principles may not hold true for such emotional loaded topics.
Particularly, a recent study showed that the personalization principle
was inverted when participants learned about serious diseases
(Kühl & Zander, 2017). The current study investigated whether
this inverted personalization effect for an aversive topic can be repli-
cated and whether the negative impact of an aversive topic on the
personalization effect can be compensated by a happy mood
(cf. Raghunathan & Trope, 2002).
1.1 | Personalization principle and its inversion for
aversive content
According to the personalization principle (cf. Mayer, 2020; Mayer, 2014),
learners benefit when a multimedia message is presented in a conversa-
tional style (i.e., personalized message) compared to a multimedia mes-
sage that is presented in a formal style (i.e., nonpersonalized message). A
personalized message can for instance be implemented when personal
pronouns such as ‘you’ and ‘your’ are used, whereas such personal pro-
nouns are non-existent in a nonpersonalized message. One explanation
of the personalization principle effect refers to self-referencing.
According to this explanation, information can be better organized and
elaborated when it is referenced to the self as compared to when infor-
mation is not referenced to the self (cf. Klein & Loftus, 1988; Rogers
et al., 1977; Symons & Johnson, 1997). By using a personalized message,
the likelihood increases that learners reference the message to them-
selves (cf. Moreno & Mayer, 2000, 2004), and as a consequence, learners
will be more engaged in processing the content. This should in turn result
in better learning outcomes. The personalization principle is empirically
well supported for learning outcomes (cf. Ginns et al., 2013; Mayer, 2017,
2020) across various domains, such as physics (Kartal, 2010), psychology
(Reichelt et al., 2014; Riehemann & Jucks, 2018), and anatomy
(e.g., Dutke et al., 2016; Ginns & Fraser, 2010; Lin et al., 2020; Mayer
et al., 2004; Schworm & Stiller, 2012; Stiller & Jedlicka, 2010). In these
studies, however, the topic can be considered as emotionally neutral.
As is pointed out in the CATLM (Moreno, 2006; Moreno &
Mayer, 2007) and similarly in the Integrated Cognitive Affective
Model of Learning with Multimedia (ICALM; Plass & Kaplan, 2016),
affective factors can play a crucial role in multimedia learning by
influencing cognitive processes. Thereby, affective factors may also
have an impact on the validity of design principles, such as the per-
sonalization principle. A recent study showed that the personalization
principle can reverse when the topic is emotionally aversive (Kühl &
Zander, 2017). In two experiments, the Kühl and Zander (2017) used
information about cerebral haemorrhage as an aversive topic. An
inverted personalization effect for the learning outcome measure of
transfer was found: Learners profited when the topic was presented
as a nonpersonalized message compared to when a learner's self was
addressed by means of a personalized message. As an underlying
mechanism for this effect, it was initially assumed that participants
with a personalized message would experience a higher increase in
state anxiety than participants with a nonpersonalized message.
However, this was not the case. In both experiments, learners' state
anxiety increased equally during learning, irrespective of personaliza-
tion. This means that state anxiety could not directly explain differ-
ences found in the learning outcomes.
This observed pattern of results for learning outcomes and state
anxiety may be explained by learners' need to repair their negative mood
(Bless & Fiedler, 2006) before investing their resources in processing
aversive information. As observed, state anxiety may generally increase
when learning about an aversive topic. However, if the message referred
to the self of the learners, then learners might have invested additional
resources for mood repair, in this case in preventing an exaggerated
increase in state anxiety. In the terminology of CLT, mood repair is a type
of task-irrelevant processing which constitutes extraneous cognitive load
(Plass & Kalyuga, 2019). Participants receiving a personalized message
thus may have been more engaged in repairing their mood. Correspond-
ingly, they have been less engaged in processing the aversive content.
This might have resulted in the observed inverted personalization effect
while differences in state anxiety were not observed. It follows from
these considerations, that when learners' need for repairing their mood is
relieved, the negative impact of referencing an aversive topic to the self
may vanish and self-referencing may even be beneficial again
(cf. Agrawal et al., 2007). This reasoning is linked to the mood-as-
resource hypothesis (Raghunathan & Trope, 2002) and will be explicated
in more detail next.
1.2 | Positive mood as a resource to counteract an
inverted personalization effect
In general, the mood of a person can foster or hinder the processing of
emotionally aversive and threatening content (e.g., Aspinwall, 1998;
Keller, 1999; Raghunathan & Trope, 2002). According to the mood-as-
a-resource hypothesis (Raghunathan & Trope, 2002), a positive mood
can serve as a buffer against the affective costs of thoroughly
processing negative information. A positive mood will deteriorate by
processing the negative information, however. In a happy mood,
learners have some resources to process negative information, but they
will balance their investment of resources with respect to the decrease
of mood. People are willing to process negative information at the
costs of their positive mood, thereby possibly allowing state anxiety to
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increase, particularly when the information has a direct connection to
themselves, as may for instance be the case for self-referenced infor-
mation. For information that is no related to themselves, the negative
information may be less intensively processed in return for maintaining
a positive mood and to avoid an increase in state anxiety. Learners in a
negative mood have hardly any resources left to cope with negative
information. This is particularly true when the information is connected
to oneself. Under such circumstances, the prior goal is to repair the
negative mood at the cost of processing the negative information.
Based upon this reasoning, the impact of mood on self-
referencing was investigated in a study about the effectiveness of
health messages (Agrawal et al., 2007; Exp. 3). In this study, partici-
pants were asked to refer an aversive health message about hepatitis
C either to oneself or to others. By inducing different emotions to par-
ticipants, the authors could show that a sad mood led to less recall
about the health message, less time spent reading additional informa-
tion about hepatitis C as well as to a worse performance on a knowl-
edge test in the self-referencing group compared to the group that
referred the information not to oneself. For a happy mood, the oppo-
site was true: Participants recalled more information about the health
message, spent more time reading additional information about hepa-
titis C and performed better on a knowledge test about this additional
information in the self-referencing group.1
In the context of multimedia learning, self-referencing can be
achieved by using a personalized compared to a nonpersonalized mes-
sage. When relating the just mentioned findings to the personalization
principle in multimedia learning, and particularly to the observed
inverted personalization effect for aversive content, it can be assumed
that the inverted personalization effect may be moderated by mood.
When participants are in the negative mood of sadness, they may lack
resources to refer an aversive content to oneself, but rather need to
invest more resources in repairing their mood, also to counteract an
exaggerated increase in state anxiety. In this case, a personalized mes-
sage may be less thoroughly processed, resulting in worse learning
outcomes compared to a nonpersonalized message. This would corre-
spond to the inverted personalization effect. However, when partici-
pants are in a happy mood, they might have the resources available to
relate the aversive content to oneself. Thus, with a happy mood, a
personalized message about an aversive topic might be more thor-
oughly processed and will result in better learning outcomes than a
nonpersonalized message. This would correspond to the personaliza-
tion effect. Looking at affect, thoroughly processing of the personal-
ized aversive information in a happy mood might come at the cost of
a more exaggerated decrease of the happy mood and in an increase in
state anxiety.
1.3 | The present study: hypotheses and research
questions
In the present study, we chose the emotionally aversive topic of cere-
bral haemorrhage. In two previous experiments, an inverted personali-
zation effect was found with this material (Kühl & Zander, 2017). It
was examined whether the factor mood (happy vs. sad mood) would
act as a moderator for the inverted personalization effect. The mood
induction procedure consisted of asking participants to either recall a
happy or a sad event of their life, like in the abovementioned studies
(Agrawal et al., 2007; Raghunathan & Trope, 2002). Building directly
up upon previous studies that used this instructional material (Kühl &
Zander, 2017; Zander et al., 2017), we assessed next to learning out-
comes, measures of state anxiety and cognitive load as well as learn-
ing times.
The primary research question concerned learning outcomes. As
explained above, we hypothesized an interaction of mood and person-
alization (Hypothesis 1): An inverted personalization effect should be
observable for participants in a sad mood (Hypothesis 1a). For partici-
pants in a happy mood, however, an inverted personalization effect
should not be observable anymore, but the beneficial effect of per-
sonalization might be re-established (Hypothesis 1b).
The secondary research questions addressed the possible mecha-
nisms for the hypothesized interaction. Thereby, changes in affective
states (mood and state anxiety) as well as indicators of processing the
content (cognitive load and learning times) were explored. Concerning
changes in affective states, we examined whether the hypothesized
interaction would also be observable for mood (Hypothesis 2) and
state anxiety (Hypothesis 3): For participants in a happy mood, mood
might more strongly deteriorate (Hypothesis 2a) and state anxiety
might more strongly increase (Hypothesis 3a) if they learn with a per-
sonalized compared to the nonpersonalized message. For participants
in a sad mood, however, these assumed differences between per-
sonalized and nonpersonalized messages should neither be observ-
able for mood (Hypothesis 2b), nor for state anxiety (Hypothesis
3b). Moreover, it was explored whether the hypothesized interac-
tion would also be mirrored for cognitive load and learning times
(Hypothesis 4 and 5): In a sad mood, a personalized message might
be perceived as more difficult and be processed with less effort
(Hypothesis 4a) as well as for a shorter time (Hypothesis 5a) than a
nonpersonalized message. In a happy mood, a personalized mes-
sage might be perceived as less difficult, be processed with more
effort (Hypothesis 4b), and for a longer time (Hypothesis 5b) than a
nonpersonalized message.
2 | METHOD
2.1 | Participants and design
One hundred thirty-one students from a German university partici-
pated either for course credit or payment in the study. The study was
advertised on bulletin boards in the university building as well as by
means of existing mailing lists for students who are generally inter-
ested in participating in studies. Participants were randomly assigned
to one of four conditions that resulted from a 2  2 between-subject
design, with mood (happy vs. sad) and personalization (personalized
vs. nonpersonalized) as independent variables. One participant
aborted the study. Furthermore, due to technical problems, the
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instructional material was presented incomplete (i.e., without pictures)
to five participants. The data of these six participants were excluded
from data analyses and the analyses were conducted for the
remaining 125 students (94 females and 31 males; average age:
M = 22.39 years, SD = 3.72).
2.2 | Mood induction
To induce a happy or a sad mood, respectively, participants were
asked to recall and to write down in detail either a happy or a sad life
event. Thereby, a cover story stated that the following tasks would be
about remembering emotional life events and that this part of the
study was conducted to construe an inventory about life events for
future studies (e.g., Bless et al., 1996; Krauth-Gruber & Ric, 2000).
The positive mood induction procedure asked the participant to
remember and write down a life event that made him/her happy,
while the negative mood induction procedure asked about a life event
that made him/her sad. Participants were given 8 min and the answer
could be typed in an empty field below the respective instruction.
2.3 | Instructional material
The computerized instructional material, which had been used in an
almost identical way in a previous study (Kühl & Zander, 2017), dealt
with the topic cerebral haemorrhages. It consisted of five pages. The
text was presented in written format and contained approximately
470 words. The text was illustrated by two pictures. In the introduc-
tory part of the instructional material, the structure of the skull and
brain were described. This part was not subject to experimental
manipulation, since it was not considered to be emotional aversive.
After this introductory part, the definition, symptoms, effects as well
as possible causes of a cerebral haemorrhage were conveyed. These
last four sections were subject to experimental manipulation and
hence presented either as a personalized message or as a non-
personalized message. For the personalized message, personal pro-
nouns such as ‘you’ and ‘your’ were used,2 while no personal
pronouns were used for the nonpersonalized message. The two text
versions differed only with regard to the use of personal pronouns.
Extracts for the personalized and nonpersonalized messages are pro-
vided in Table 1. Participants could navigate to the next page by using
a ‘next’ button (i.e., self-paced). The instructional material was pres-
ented in the lab via the web-based software Unipark (www.
unipark.com).
2.4 | Measures
The computer-based measures consisted of (1) a participant question-
naire including a test about prior knowledge of cerebral
haemorrhages, (2) scales intended to assess mood, (3) a scale
assessing state anxiety, (4) cognitive load items, (5) a knowledge test
about the topic of the instructional material, and (6) learning time. Fur-
ther measures were assessed for exploratory purposes after the
knowledge test ended so that they could not influence the results for
the essential research questions. These measures will not be further
explored within this article (the measures were: cognitive avoidance,
motivation, disgust, perceived efficacy, self-risk, threat, health anxiety,
personal relevance, personal connection to cerebral haemorrhages, as
well as comments to the study).
2.4.1 | Participant questionnaire including a prior
knowledge test
Next to demographic data, participants were asked about their self-
rated knowledge on the topic of cerebral haemorrhage and were
asked about their interest in this topic, which they each had to rate
on a five-point Likert scale (1 = very low; 5 = very high). In addition,
participants were asked about their final school exam grade. Prior
knowledge was assessed by one open question that asked partici-
pants to write down everything they know concerning a cerebral
haemorrhage. The answers to this prior knowledge test were
corrected by two independent raters according to a predefined coding
scheme. Inter-rater agreement was very good (Krippendorff's
α = 0.90; cf. Hayes & Krippendorff, 2007). The final score of this prior
knowledge test was obtained by using the arithmetic mean of the
TABLE 1 Extract of the two different versions of the instructional
material (Section: ‘Symptoms’)
Personalized message Nonpersonalized message
With a cerebral haemorrhage
you get a severe headache of
unprecedented intensity.
Furthermore, you develop
dizziness and nausea and you
probably have to vomit.
Depending on which of your
brain areas is affected, a
cerebral haemorrhage can
cause that you experience
neurological failure. In the
further course, a cerebral
haemorrhage can cause a
clouding of your
consciousness (vigilance
dysfunction) up to coma. The
latter one would go along
with life threatening
respiratory dysfunction. The
pressure in your brain can
increase. This increase can go
along with a circulatory
collapse, but also leads to
death in many cases.




and nausea develop and
probably lead to vomiting.
Depending on which of the
brain areas is affected, a
cerebral haemorrhage can
cause neurological failure. In
the further course, a cerebral
haemorrhage can cause a
clouding of consciousness
(vigilance dysfunction) up to
coma. The latter one would go
along with life threatening
respiratory dysfunction. The
pressure in the brain can
increase. This increase can go
along with a circulatory
collapse, but also leads to death
in many cases.
Note: The original instructional material was in German.
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scoring of the two raters (with an observed maximum score of six
points).
2.4.2 | Mood assessment
A shortened version of the Positive and Negative Activation Schedule
(PANAS3; Watson et al., 1988) was used, namely the International
PANAS Short Form (I-PANAS-SF; Thompson, 2007). The I-PANAS-SF
consist of 10 items, five items for measuring the Positive Activation
subscale (PAS) and five items to measure the Negative Activation sub-
scale (NAS). The five items of the PAS are ‘active’, ‘determined’,
‘attentive’, ‘inspired’, ‘alert’; the five items of the NAS are ‘afraid’
‘nervous’, ‘upset’, ‘hostile’, ‘ashamed’. Participants were asked to
indicate how they currently feel by rating these 10 items on a five-
point Likert scale ranging (from 1 = not at all to 5 = very much). The
PAS and the NAS were both assessed twice: Once directly after
the mood induction procedure (in the following PAS 1 and NAS
1, respectively), and once after the learning phase ended (in the fol-
lowing PAS 2 and NAS 2, respectively). The internal consistency of
the PAS 1 (α = 0.75), PAS 2 (α = 0.87), NAS 1 (α = 0.79) and NAS 2
(α = 0.75) were acceptable to good.
2.4.3 | State anxiety
State anxiety was measured with a six-item short-form (Marteau &
Bekker, 1992) consisting of six statements (e.g., ‘I am relaxed’) that
had to be rated on a four-point Likert scale (1 = not at all; 4 = very
much so). A higher score indicated a higher state anxiety. The internal
consistency of the STAI was acceptable (α = 0.68 for the first mea-
surement; α = 0.78 for the second measurement).
2.4.4 | Cognitive load measures
Subjective cognitive load ratings that are associated with difficulty were
measured with seven items (based on Koch et al., 2008) and were also
used in a previous study by Kühl and Zander (2017). These items were:
(1) ‘How easy or difficult do you consider the topic of cerebral
haemorrhage?’; (2) ‘How easy or difficult was it for you to connect new
information to what you already knew about the topic?’, (3) ‘How easy
or difficult was it for you to work with the instructional material?’,
(4) ‘How easy or difficult is it for you to distinguish between important
and unimportant information in the instructional material?’, (5) ‘How
easy or difficult is it for you to collect the information necessary to
understand the instructional material?’, (6) ‘How easy or difficult was it
to understand the instructional material?’ and (7) ‘How easy or difficult
was it for you to imagine the process of a cerebral haemorrhage?’ All
items had to be rated on a seven-point Likert scale (1 = very easy;
7 = very difficult). All items were summed up to one score (min = 7;
max = 49). The internal consistency of this questionnaire was very good
(α = 0.88). Moreover, one item about mental effort (cf. Paas, 1992) had
to be rated on a seven-point Likert scale (1 = very little; 7 = very much).
2.4.5 | Knowledge tests
Learning outcomes were measured by a retention test and a transfer
test (that was quite similar to the one used by Kühl & Zander, 2017).
The retention question was identical to the question of the prior
knowledge test (‘Please write down everything you know about the
medical processes of a cerebral hemorrhage’), but there were no time
restrictions in answering this question. Transfer performance was
assessed by four transfer tasks: (1) ‘What kind of treatment could you
imagine for dealing with a cerebral haemorrhage? Please write down
all plausible answers’. (2) ‘How could medical innovations prevent
that a severe cerebral haemorrhage occurs?’ (3) ‘What could be rea-
sons that some people survive for the first hours after a cerebral
haemorrhage occurs without medical care? Write down all plausible
answers’. (4) ‘How would a permanently low blood pressure affect
the probability of suffering a cerebral haemorrhage? Please explain
your answer’. To give an impression for correct answers, using the
example of the first transfer task, acceptable answers could for
instance address that blood may be aspirated by a tube or that the
skull could be opened temporary. The answers of the retention ques-
tion and the transfer tasks were corrected by two independent raters
according to a predefined coding scheme. Inter-rater agreement was
very good for retention (Krippendorff's α = 0.96) as well as for trans-
fer (Krippendorff's α = 0.96). The score for retention and for transfer
were determined by the arithmetic mean of the scores of the two
raters. For retention, the observed maximum score was 12 points and
for transfer, the observed maximum score was nine points.
2.4.6 | Learning time
Via the web-based software Unipark, the time participants had spent
on each computerized page, and thereby with the instructional mate-
rial, was logged. These data are an estimate of the time learners actu-
ally spent with the instructional material.
2.5 | Procedure
The study took place in a computer lab at the university. Per session,
up to six participants could take part. Before starting the experiment,
each participant received a written informed consent, stating that it
was possible for them to quit the experiment with no repercussions
or disadvantage at any time. With the exception of the written con-
sent form, all materials and measures were computerized and pres-
ented on a computer screen via the web-based software Unipark
(www.unipark.com). The random assignment of participants to condi-
tions was governed by the software. After consenting to participate,
participants completed the participant questionnaire, followed by the
prior knowledge test, for which participants were given a maximum of
5 min to answer. Then the mood induction procedure started and
lasted 8 min. The actual purpose of the mood induction was not
explained to avoid demand effects. Subsequently, the I-PANAS-SF
and then the STAI were given for the first time. Thereafter,
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participants could learn with the instructional material at their own
pace. Then, participants received the I-PANAS-SF and the STAI for a
second time, followed by the questions about cognitive load. Partici-
pants then took the knowledge tests. There was no time restriction
for answering the knowledge test. After the knowledge test was com-
pleted, participants received the aforementioned measures that were
assessed for exploratory purposes. Finally, participants
were debriefed. A session lasted approximately 40 min. The experi-
ment was approved by the local ethics committee of the University.
During the entire procedure, we followed American Psychological
Association guidelines for the ethical treatment of human research
participants.
3 | RESULTS
First, the control variables were checked for differences between con-
ditions. Second, it was examined whether mood as well as state anxi-
ety changed between conditions. Third, for the dependent variables
of cognitive load, learning outcomes and learning time, it was analysed
whether the conditions would differ. Table 2 provides an overview of
means and standard deviations (SD) for the different condition.
3.1 | Control variables
2  2 between-subject ANOVAs with mood (happy vs. sad) and per-
sonalization (personalized vs. nonpersonalized) as independent
variables were conducted. Results revealed neither differences for
mood, nor for personalization, nor an interaction for the following
control variables: interest (all Fs < 1.16, all ps > 0.28), final exam grade
(all Fs < 1, all ps > 0.49), or prior knowledge (all Fs < 1.16, all
ps > 0.28). For self-estimated knowledge, there were no main effects
(both Fs < 1, both ps > 0.54), and a marginal interaction, F(1,
121) = 3.60, p = 0.060, η2p = 0.029.
3.2 | Mood
The PAS 1 and NAS 1 served as the manipulation check for the mood
induction procedure. For the PAS 1 or the NAS 1 - which were
assessed directly after the mood induction procedure – 2  2 ANO-
VAs with mood and personalization as independent variables revealed
no main effects of personalization, both Fs < 2.15, both ps > 0.14, and
no interactions, both Fs < 1.58, both ps > 0.21. Surprisingly, however,
no differences were observable for the factor mood, both Fs < 1.39,
both ps > 0.24. Thus, the mood induction procedure had no significant
impact on the assessed manipulation check measures PAS 1 and NAS
1. In the hindsight, this missing effect for mood may be a problem of
the two scales for adequately measuring a happy and a sad mood,
rather than a failure of actually inducing mood with the described pro-
cedure. This limitation will be taken up in a following evaluation study
(Section 4) as well as in the Discussion (Section 5).
The research question associated with the mood measures was to
examine whether the mood for participants receiving the happy mood
induction would more strongly deteriorate when they received the
TABLE 2 Means (and SD) as a function of mood induction and personalization
Mood induction
Happy Sad
Personalization Personalized (n = 33) Nonpersonalized (n = 32) Personalized (n = 30) Nonpersonalized (n = 30)
Control variables
Interest 2.88 (1.02) 3.06 (1.05) 2.87 (1.04) 2.67 (1.12)
Self-rated prior knowledge 1.45 (0.71) 1.84 (0.95) 1.77 (0.97) 1.57 (0.82)
Prior knowledge 1.48 (1.43) 1.63 (1.40) 1.97 (1.33) 1.65 (1.06)
Affect-related scales
PAS 1 17.79 (3.38) 16.19 (3.20) 16.53 (4.42) 16.47 (2.34)
NAS 1 6.67 (2.41) 7.78 (2.98) 7.63 (3.09) 8.03 (3.06)
PAS 2 17.06 (3.66) 15.75 (4.12) 16.60 (4.67) 18.03 (3.00)
NAS 2 6.09 (1.70) 6.94 (2.58) 7.57 (3.13) 6.63 (1.71)
STAI (before learning) 11.00 (2.65) 12.03 (2.78) 11.77 (3.16) 11.27 (2.65)
STAI (after learning) 11.15 (2.95) 12.31 (2.97) 12.97 (3.69) 12.20 (2.80)
Cognitive load
Difficulty 21.58 (7.53) 21.25 (6.29) 20.87 (6.60) 19.63 (6.06)
Effort 4.58 (1.23) 4.09 (1.53) 5.00 (1.70) 4.83 (1.34)
Learning outcomes
Retention 7.29 (3.04) 5.55 (3.07) 6.32 (3.35) 7.93 (3.07)
Transfer 4.32 (1.65) 4.02 (1.99) 3.42 (1.95) 4.52 (1.92)
Learning time (in seconds) 214.85 (91.32) 188.22 (87.34) 186.20 (75.09) 226.80 (81.60)
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personalized compared to the nonpersonalized message (Hypothesis
2a). In contrast, these differences between personalized and non-
personalized messages should not be observable for participants
receiving the sad mood induction (Hypothesis 2b). Mixed-design
ANOVAs with the between-subject variables personalization and
mood and the within-variable PAS (PAS 1 to PAS 2) or NAS (NAS 1 to
NAS 2), respectively, were conducted. For PAS, results revealed no
main effect of mood, or of personalization, or of changes from PAS
1 to PAS 2, no interaction of PAS and personalization, and no three-
way interaction between PAS, mood and personalization, all Fs < 2.58,
all ps > 0.11, but a marginal interaction between personalization and
mood, F(1,121) = 3.24, p = 0.074, η2p = 0.026, and a significant inter-
action between PAS and mood, F(1, 121) = 6.31, p = 0.013,
η2p = 0.050. For the interaction between PAS and mood, pairwise
comparisons showed that there was no change from PAS 1 to PAS
2 for participants who received the happy mood induction procedure,
p = 0.134, η2p = 0.018, while participants who received the sad mood
induction procedure had higher score on PAS 2 than on PAS 1,
p = 0.044, η2p = 0.033, indicating that their positive activation
increased.
For the NAS, the mixed ANOVA revealed no main effects of
mood, or of personalization, no interaction between mood and per-
sonalization, no interaction of NAS and mood, and no three-way inter-
action, all Fs < 2.30, all ps > 0.13. There was a main effect for changes
in the score from NAS 1 to NAS 2, F(1,121) = 9.93, p = 0.002,
η2p = 0.076, with a significant decrease in negative activation from
the first to the second measurement. This main effect was qualified
by a marginal interaction between NAS and personalization, F
(1,121) = 3.06, p = 0.083, η2p = 0.025. Pairwise comparisons revealed
that there was only a significant decrease from the first to the second
measurement for participants receiving the nonpersonalized message,
p = 0.001, η2p = 0.090, while there was no significant decrease for
participants with the personalized message, p = 0.321, η2p = 0.008.
Overall, these results for the PAS and the NAS are not in line with the
assumptions of Hypothesis 2.
3.3 | State anxiety
It was explored whether for participants with the happy mood induc-
tion there would be a higher increase in state anxiety when they
received the personalized compared to the nonpersonalized message
(Hypothesis 3a). In contrast, these differences in the increase of state
anxiety between participants with the personalized and non-
personalized messages should not be observable for participants
receiving the sad mood induction (Hypothesis 3b). A mixed-design
ANOVA with the between-subject variables personalization and mood
and the within-variable STAI (first to second measurement) was con-
ducted. The results revealed no main effects of mood or of personali-
zation, no interaction of state anxiety and personalization, and no
three-way interaction, all Fs < 1, all ps > 0.38. A marginal interaction
between mood and personalization was observable, F(1,121) = 3.10,
p = 0.081, η2p = 0.025, which could however not reasonably be
traced back by pairwise comparisons, all ps > 0.11. There was a main
effect of changes in state anxiety, with an increase in state anxiety
from the first to the second measurement, F(1,121) = 10.13,
p = 0.002, η2p = 0.077. This main effect was qualified by a significant
interaction of state anxiety and mood, F(1,121) = 4.45, p = 0.037,
η2p = 0.035. Pairwise comparisons showed that the increase in state
anxiety was only evident in conditions where participants received
the sad mood induction procedure, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.100, but not in
conditions where participants received the happy mood induction
procedure, p = 0.440, η2p = 0.005. These results are only partly in line
with Hypothesis 3: The equal increase in state anxiety for those par-
ticipants with personalized and nonpersonalized messages that
received the sad mood induction is in line with the Hypothesis 3b.
However, the generally missing increase for participants receiving the
happy mood induction is not in line with the Hypothesis 3a, as an
increase was expected for participants receiving the personalized
message.
3.4 | Cognitive load
In Hypothesis 4, it was asked whether participants in a sad mood
might perceive the personalized message as more difficult and process
it with less effort than a nonpersonalized message (Hypothesis 4a),
while the opposite may be the case for participants in a happy mood
(Hypothesis 4b). Concerning subjective ratings of difficulty, a 2  2
ANOVA showed no main effects of personalization or of mood and
no interaction between mood and personalization, all Fs < 1, all
ps > 0.33. For effort, a 2 x 2 ANOVA showed no main effect of per-
sonalization and no interaction of personalization and mood, both
Fs < 1.55, both ps > 0.21, but a main effect of mood, F(1, 121) = 4.98,
p = 0.028, η2p = 0.039, with participants receiving the sad mood
induction procedure stating to have invested a higher amount of men-
tal effort than learners in a happy mood induction procedure. How-
ever, effort did not correlate with retention, r = 0.07, p = 0.45, or
transfer, r = 0.03, p = 0.76, while difficulty was negatively associated
with retention, r =  0.40, p < 0.001, and with transfer, r =  0.29,
p = 0.001. All in all, the results for perceived difficulty and effort are
not in line with the assumptions of Hypothesis 4.
3.5 | Learning outcomes
An interaction of mood and personalization was hypothesized for the
major dependent variable, namely learning outcomes (Hypothesis 1).
An inverted personalization effect was assumed to be observable for
participants that received the sad mood induction procedure
(Hypothesis 1a). However, for participants that received the happy
mood induction procedure, the beneficial effect of personalization
might be re-established (Hypothesis 1b). Concerning retention, a
2  2 ANOVA revealed neither a main effect of personalization, nor
a main effect of mood, both Fs < 1.59, both ps > 0.20, but a significant
interaction, F(1, 121) = 8.97, p = 0.003, η2p = 0.069. This interaction
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was traced back by means of pairwise comparisons: Participants that
received the sad mood induction procedure performed better when
they learned with the nonpersonalized compared to the personalized
version, p = 0.048, η2p = 0.032, while participants that received the
happy mood induction procedure performed better when they
learned with the personalized compared to the nonpersonalized ver-
sion, p = 0.027, η2p = 0.040.
Similarly, for transfer, a 2 x 2 ANOVA showed no main effects of
personalization or of mood, both Fs < 1.43, both ps > 0.23, but a sig-
nificant interaction, F(1, 121) = 4.29, p = 0.040, η2p = 0.034. Pairwise
comparisons showed that participants that received the sad mood
induction procedure performed better when they learned with the
nonpersonalized compared to the personalized version, p = 0.025,
η2p = 0.041, while participants in the happy mood induction proce-
dure performed equally in the personalized compared to the non-
personalized version, p = 0.529, η2p = 0.003. These results are
essentially in line with Hypothesis 1.
3.6 | Learning time
Hypothesis 5 explored whether participants in a sad mood would pro-
cess a personalized message for a shorter time than a nonpersonalized
message (Hypothesis 5a), while participants in a happy mood would
process a personalized message for a longer time than a non-
personalized message (Hypothesis 5b). A 2  2 ANOVA for learning
time showed no main effects of personalization or of mood, both
Fs < 1, both ps > 0.64, but a significant interaction, F(1, 121) = 4.96,
p = 0.028, η2p = 0.039. Pairwise comparisons showed that partici-
pants who received the sad mood induction procedure tended to
learn a longer time with the nonpersonalized compared to the person-
alized version, p = 0.065, η2p = 0.028, while participants who
received the happy mood induction procedure learned equally long in
the personalized and the nonpersonalized version, p = 0.205,
η2p = 0.013. Learning time marginally correlated with retention,
r = 0.16, p = 0.08, but not with transfer, r = 0.06, p = 0.52. In line
with Hypothesis 5a, participants in a sad mood tended to process a
personalized message for a shorter time than a nonpersonalized mes-
sage. Contrary to Hypothesis 5b, participants in a happy mood did not
process a personalized message longer than a nonpersonalized
message.
4 | EVALUATION STUDY: MEASURING A
HAPPY OR SAD MOOD
One limitation was that the mood induction procedures had no signifi-
cant impact on the manipulation check measure I-PANAS-SF. How-
ever, a missing effect for a manipulation check does not necessarily
mean that mood was not induced, as the used mood induction proce-
dure is usually quite successful (cf. Westermann et al., 1996). A possi-
ble alternative explanation is that the manipulation check measure
was not sensitive enough for the scope of the current study. This
evaluation study was conducted ex post in order to test the sensitivity
of the measure for the induction procedure.
The same mood induction procedures as in the experiment as
well as the I-PANAS-SF (and STAI) were applied. Moreover, two ques-
tions that directly asked for a happy and sad mood were additionally
administered. If no significant differences between the mood induc-
tion procedures would be observable for the I-PANAS-SF, but for the
questions that directly ask for a happy and sad mood, respectively,
this would strengthen the case for the claim that a happy and sad
mood were also induced in the main study, but were not detected by
the I-PANAS-SF.
4.1 | Method
4.1.1 | Participants, design and measures
Fifty German university students took part in this study. They were
randomly assigned to either the happy or sad mood induction proce-
dure. The data of 10 participants were excluded (see below for more
details). Of the remaining 40 participants (age: M = 21.35, SD = 2.71),
29 were female and 11 were male. The mood induction procedure
(including cover story) was the same as in the main experiment. The
internal consistency of the PAS (α = 0.79), NAS (α = 0.80) and STAI
(α = 0.70) were acceptable to good. Next to these measures, addition-
ally one question asked about how happy participants felt at the
moment and one further question asked about how sad participants
felt at the moment. Participants had to indicate on two 9-point scales
(1 = not at all to 9 = very) how happy and how sad they felt. These
two items were summed up to one score (after recoding the item
about sadness; α = 0.88), with a higher score reflecting more happi-
ness or less sadness, respectively. Three evaluation questions asked
participants, (1) whether they already took part in a study where this
mood induction procedure was used (yes or no), (2) whether they seri-
ously took part in this study so that their data can be reasonably be
used (yes or no) – with the hint that the answer will not affect their
course credit and (3) whether they have comments about this study.
Participants who answered the first question with yes (N = 9) were
excluded from data analyses. The data of one further participant who
refused to write down an emotional event were also excluded from
data analyses. No participant indicated that he/she did not seriously
took part in this study.
4.1.2 | Procedure
Before taken part in this evaluation study, participants first took part
in an unrelated study that lasted approximately 20 min. Thereafter,
first, the I-PANAS-SF, then the two questions concerning happiness
and sadness, and then the STAI were given. Subsequently, the evalua-
tion questions were given. Finally, participants were debriefed. All
materials and measures of this online study were computerized and
presented via the web-based software Unipark (www.unipark.com).
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4.2 | Results and discussion
Means and standard deviations are presented in Table 3.
T-test for independent samples revealed no significant differ-
ences between the happy and sad mood induction procedures for
PAS, t(38) = 1.15; p = 0.26, d = 0.37, bias corrected accelerated 95%
confidence interval (BCa 95%) CI [ 0.77, 3.59], nor for NAS, t
(38) =  1.18; p = 0.24, d =  0.37, BCa 95% CI [ 4.22, 1.23]. Also,
there were no significant differences for STAI, t(38) = 1.80;
p = 0.08, d =  0.57, BCa 95% CI [ 3.98, 0.49]. However, there was
a significant difference for the two questions about happiness and
sadness, with participants in the happy mood condition scoring higher
than participants in the sad mood condition, t(29.52) = 2.12;
p = 0.048, d = 0.67, BCa 95% CI [0.20, 5.51].
To sum up, while asking about happiness and sadness was
appropriate to detect differences between the two mood induction
procedures, the usage of the I-PANAS-SF was not, indicating that the
I-PANAS-SF may not be well suited to detect a happy or sad mood,
respectively.
5 | SUMMARY & DISCUSSION
The present study investigated whether a previous observed inverted
personalization effect for an aversive topic (Kühl & Zander, 2017)
would be moderated by mood. The main goal was to test this
assumption for learning outcomes. Based on the mood-as-a
resource hypothesis as well as previous findings in the area of
health messages (Agrawal et al., 2007; Raghunathan &
Trope, 2002), we hypothesized that an inverted personalization
effect would be observable when participants were in a sad mood,
while a beneficial effect of a personalized message might be
observable for participants in a happy mood. As a subordinate goal,
we examined whether the pattern of results for learning outcomes
would be mirrored by respective changes in affective states as well
as by corresponding process data.
5.1 | Learning outcomes
Our primary research question concerned learning outcomes. In line
with Hypothesis 1, we observed a moderating role of mood for an
inverted personalization effect. For participants in the sad mood con-
ditions, a personalized compared to a nonpersonalized message
resulted in lower performance for the learning outcomes of retention
and transfer, indicating the inverted personalization effect. These
results of the sad mood conditions basically replicate the findings
from a previous study (Kühl & Zander, 2017). For participants in
the happy mood conditions, however, a personalized compared to a
nonpersonalized message was beneficial, particularly for retention,
while for transfer a personalized message was at least not harmful
anymore. These results point to the importance to closer investi-
gate the interplay of different affective factors that can occur dur-
ing learning.
5.2 | Mood and state anxiety
It can be claimed that the mood induction procedure in the main
experiment was successful, even though direct evidence is missing.
First, the mood induction procedure of remembering a happy or sad
life events is a common method that is typically successful (e.g., Bless
et al., 1996; Krauth-Gruber & Ric, 2000; for a meta-analysis see
Westermann et al., 1996). Second, the manipulation check measure I-
PANAS-SF (Thompson, 2007), turned out to be unsuitable to differen-
tiate between participants that received either the instruction to recall
a happy or to recall a sad life event. The results of the evaluation study
substantiate this claim. Third, the differentiated findings for the learn-
ing outcome measures were essentially in line with expectations about
the impact of mood (and previous research; cf. Agrawal et al., 2007),
and are thus quite unlikely to appear by chance. Taken together, this
indirect evidence corroborates our claim that a positive and a negative
mood have been actually induced in the mood induction conditions of
the main experiment. Given the limitations of the I-PANAS-SF for
measuring a happy and sad mood in the current study, we refrain from
interpreting the observed results for the PAS and NAS scales.
State anxiety increased from before the learning phase started to
after the learning phase ended only for participants that had received
the sad mood induction procedure. This increase was not differently
pronounced between participants receiving a personalized compared
to a nonpersonalized message. The results for participants in the sad
mood conditions also replicate the results of the previous published
study with respect to state anxiety (Kühl & Zander, 2017) and are in
line with Hypothesis 3b. For participants receiving the happy mood
induction procedure, there was however no increase in state anxiety
between the first and second measurement. This may be seen as a
hint that the happy mood served as a buffer against the negative
affective costs in processing aversive content (Raghunathan &
Trope, 2002). Due to this buffer function, a personalized message was
not disadvantageous anymore, but could rather unfold its potential for
learning again, thereby enabling participants receiving a personalized
message to deeper process the aversive content. However, contrary
to Hypothesis 3a, there was no specific increase in state anxiety for
participants in the happy mood condition that had received the per-
sonalized message. This indicates that the more thorough processing
of the personalized message was not at the expense of an increased
state anxiety.
TABLE 3 Means (and SD) as a function of mood induction
Happy (n = 21) Sad (n = 19)
PAS 16.86 (3.15) 15.47 (4.39)
NAS 7.57 (2.71) 9.00 (4.75)
Happy-Sad 13.10 (3.19) 10.26 (5.14)
STAI 11.71 (3.16) 13.58 (3.40)
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5.3 | Processing aversive content: learning time
and cognitive load
To gain further insights about how the aversive content was
processed in the different conditions, we assessed the dependent var-
iables learning time and cognitive load. Participants in the sad mood
condition tended to learn a longer time with the nonpersonalized
compared to the personalized message, in line with Hypothesis 5a.
Contrary to Hypothesis 5b, however, participants in the happy mood
condition took the same time when learning with a personalized com-
pared to a nonpersonalized message, thereby especially mirroring
results from the transfer test. However, learning time did not correlate
with transfer and it was only marginally related with retention. Thus,
learning times per se may not be able to explain the results. In this
respect, learning time might be considered rather as a necessary, but
not sufficient factor.
Concerning cognitive load, the difficulty questionnaire as well as
the mental effort item did not mirror the results for learning outcomes
and were thus not in line with the assumptions of Hypothesis 4. It
may be that the used questionnaire of the current study was not opti-
mal for measuring cognitive load. In this respect, it should be noted
that there is no measurement which has received unanimous recogni-
tion yet. However, recently some promising measures evolved
(Klepsch & Seufert, 2020) that may be used in future studies.
5.4 | Limitations and outlook
A clear limitation of this study is that the mood manipulation check by
means of the I-PANAS-SF was not successful. It can be argued that it
is fair to assume that the mood induction procedure worked, but was
simply not detected by the I-PANAS-SF. Nevertheless, the usage of a
valid manipulation check, such as in the evaluation study, would have
been desirable and should definitively be applied for ongoing studies.
As explicated by Westermann et al. (1996), it is sometimes argued
that measuring affective states makes participants aware that the
influence of affective states is examined. This in turn can lead to
demand effects that undermine the validity of the observed results.
This possibility can be diminished by deceiving participants about the
true purpose of the experiment. Therefore, we used a cover story that
framed the mood induction procedure as an independent study (see
Section 2.2). Thus, we do not think that our results are considerably
influenced by our assessed measures. Nevertheless, this issue may be
investigated more systematically in future studies.
5.5 | Conclusion
The present study showed that mood moderated learning with a per-
sonalized compared to a nonpersonalized message. The results repli-
cated an inverted personalization effect for an emotionally aversive
topic, but only for participants that were asked to remember a sad life
event prior to learning. For participants who were asked to remember
a happy life event, no inverted personalization was found, but the
beneficial effect of personalization appeared, at least for the learning
outcome measure of retention.
These results stress on the one hand the importance to consider
the inherent emotional content of a topic, such as its aversive nature,
since the emotional content of a topic can be a boundary condition
for design principles in multimedia learning. This impact of the emo-
tional content of a topic is rather neglected yet. Moreover, the results
emphasize the complex interplay between affective factors, such as
externally induced as well as inherently arising moods and emotions
that can emerge during learning an emotionally loaded content
(e.g., Um et al., 2012). By taking these factors into account, more
precise guidelines can be derived when several design principles in
multimedia learning may hold true, be invalid or even reverse. The
present results support the CATLM (Moreno, 2006; Moreno &
Mayer, 2007) and the ICALM (Plass & Kaplan, 2016), as these theo-
ries pave the way in considering affective factors and how they can
impact cognitive processing and design principles in multimedia
learning. Even though recently the impact of affective factors in
multimedia learning has received increased attention (e.g., Chung &
Cheon, 2020; Endres et al., 2020; Mayer & Estrella, 2014; Plass
et al., 2014; Um et al., 2012; for meta-analyses see Brom
et al., 2018; Wong & Adesope, 2020), understanding the complex
interplay of these factors and their impact on learning with multi-
media is still at an early stage and needs to be further examined in
future studies.
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ENDNOTES
1 Agrawal et al. (2007) also induced positive and negative emotions that
did not focus on the self, but on others (peacefulness and agitation).
They could show that the abovementioned finding on self-referencing
was only true for the self-related emotions of happiness and sadness.
2 In the German language, the conversational style can be distinguished in
second-person singular and second-person plural. For this study, the
second-person singular form was chosen (e.g., “Du” or “Deine”), since it
is better going with a conversational style for students and is less formal.
3 The PANAS was originally named Positive and Negative Affect Schedule,
but renamed in Positive and Negative Activation Schedule, since the ref-
erence to affect was considered to be misleading (Tellegen et al., 1999).
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